unico Status Page

Jul 13, 2026 · resolved Jul 13

Executive Summary and Impact On July 13, 2026, we identified an instability in our identity verification capability, generating errors on a minimal portion of IDCloud requests, affecting multiple authentication flows. The issue was detected through automated availability alerts around 9:27 AM BRT, with a slight increase in errors already noticeable from approximately 8:00 AM BRT and a significant worsening starting around 9:07 AM BRT, reaching peak impact around 9:49 AM BRT. Root Cause and Resolution The root cause was identified as a gradual change applied to an internal authentication component, which caused a failure in session token signature validation. Once the root cause was confirmed, the engineering team reverted the change, and service availability returned to normal. The most critical phase of the impact lasted approximately 44 minutes. Commitment and Next Steps Engineering is evaluating improvements to the change-validation process for gradual rollouts affecting critical authentication components, including automatic rollback mechanisms in case of error spikes during this type of rollout. A detailed postmortem is expected to be shared internally as a next step.

Jul 10, 2026 · resolved Jul 10

Executive Summary and Impact Between 1:21 PM and 2:16 PM (Brasília Time) on July 10, 2026, we identified a fluctuation in the availability of the process creation flow and related journeys, resulting in a temporary spike in the error rate of some of our main APIs. - Scope of Impact: The event exclusively affected the availability of certain journeys during this interval. Customers who did not experience an increase in their error rate during this period were not impacted. - Data Integrity: There was no compromise to the integrity or security of the processed information. - Mitigation: An initial workaround was applied within a few minutes, halting the volume of errors. The service was fully normalized at 2:16 PM, following stability confirmation from our Engineering and Monitoring teams. Root Cause The incident was triggered by instability in an infrastructure service, followed by a sudden degradation in the initialization of related internal components. Commitment and Next Steps We are deeply committed to the resilience of our platform. The corrective and preventive actions initiated during the incident are already being monitored to mitigate the risk of future occurrences of this nature. - Postmortem: A detailed technical report (Postmortem) will be shared soon, containing the complete timeline, architectural analysis, and a long-term action plan with defined deadlines. We sincerely apologize for the impact and instability caused. Our customers' trust is our highest priority, and we continue to work continuously to ensure the excellence of our services. Sincerely, Unico Team

Jul 7, 2026 · resolved Jul 7

**Post-Mortem: Availability Instability in Identity Processing** **Summary** On two occasions on consecutive days in July 2026, the identity processing service experienced brief drops in availability. These were caused by saturation in a shared database that supports part of the verification flow. Both events were quickly identified by the monitoring teams, mitigated within approximately 30 minutes, and resolved with zero data loss. **Impact** Incident 1 — July 6, 2026, from 13:00 to 13:34 \(BRT\): A sudden and legitimate spike in request volume overloaded the database replica serving the service. Clients using services dependent on verification score generation experienced slowness, as requests were automatically retried instead of returning errors. Verification processes continued to complete successfully, albeit with delays. Incident 2 — July 7, 2026, from 17:52 to 18:05 \(BRT\): A database query lacking a row-return limit was triggered by an edge-case data pattern, saturating the CPU of the same database replica. This increased latency and, for a short window \(around 13 minutes\), caused errors in certain steps of the verification flow for a subset of clients. In both cases, the impact was limited to the windows described above, without total service downtime and with zero data loss. **Root Cause** Both incidents share the same underlying cause: CPU saturation on a relational database replica that serves multiple capabilities of the identity verification service. In the first incident, a specific request volume surged roughly 10x within a few minutes, exceeding the provisioned capacity for the replica. The database infrastructure was not scaled to sustain the peak, leading to processing exhaustion \(CPU scheduling contention\) and a subsequent cascade of timeouts in dependent services. In the second incident, a specific query lacked a limit on returned rows. When executed for a record with an unusual volume of associated images, the query triggered a full table scan and sort, consuming all available processing power on the replica. This effect was amplified by two internal mechanisms that, combined, tripled the number of queries generated per request. **Resolution** In both incidents, the operations teams: Vertically scaled a secondary database replica and redirected traffic to it via a DNS update; Temporarily disabled mechanisms that were generating additional database load; Monitored the stabilization of availability metrics before declaring the incident resolved; Following the second incident, applied a definitive fix to the problematic query \(enforcing a limit on returned records\) and initiated a data-cleansing process for non-standard records that could replicate the scenario. **Lessons Learned** These incidents reinforced the need for defensive and systematic infrastructure design, applying explicit limits and pagination on database queries to eliminate latent risks under atypical traffic. It became evident that component migrations can inadvertently strip away implicit protections against overload. This makes the implementation of declarative resilience mechanisms—such as proper timeouts, circuit breakers, and connection limits—indispensable. Additionally, the scenario highlighted the importance of investigating the root cause of recurring saturation patterns rather than relying solely on point-in-time mitigations, as well as the urgency of monitoring and refactoring architectures that multiply database calls per request to mitigate load amplification risks before they become critical. **Closing** We acknowledge the impact these instabilities caused and apologize for any inconvenience experienced by our clients and partners during these windows. Transparency regarding what happened is part of our commitment to those who trust our platform. The actions taken in response to these incidents prioritize reinforcing our environment's stability and reducing the likelihood of recurrence. We continue to invest heavily in observability, infrastructure resilience, and incident response processes to ensure an increasingly reliable service. Unico Team

Jul 6, 2026 · resolved Jul 6

**Post-Mortem: Availability Instability in Identity Processing** **Summary** On two occasions on consecutive days in July 2026, the identity processing service experienced brief drops in availability. These were caused by saturation in a shared database that supports part of the verification flow. Both events were quickly identified by the monitoring teams, mitigated within approximately 30 minutes, and resolved with zero data loss. **Impact** Incident 1 — July 6, 2026, from 13:00 to 13:34 \(BRT\): A sudden and legitimate spike in request volume overloaded the database replica serving the service. Clients using services dependent on verification score generation experienced slowness, as requests were automatically retried instead of returning errors. Verification processes continued to complete successfully, albeit with delays. Incident 2 — July 7, 2026, from 17:52 to 18:05 \(BRT\): A database query lacking a row-return limit was triggered by an edge-case data pattern, saturating the CPU of the same database replica. This increased latency and, for a short window \(around 13 minutes\), caused errors in certain steps of the verification flow for a subset of clients. In both cases, the impact was limited to the windows described above, without total service downtime and with zero data loss. **Root Cause** Both incidents share the same underlying cause: CPU saturation on a relational database replica that serves multiple capabilities of the identity verification service. In the first incident, a specific request volume surged roughly 10x within a few minutes, exceeding the provisioned capacity for the replica. The database infrastructure was not scaled to sustain the peak, leading to processing exhaustion \(CPU scheduling contention\) and a subsequent cascade of timeouts in dependent services. In the second incident, a specific query lacked a limit on returned rows. When executed for a record with an unusual volume of associated images, the query triggered a full table scan and sort, consuming all available processing power on the replica. This effect was amplified by two internal mechanisms that, combined, tripled the number of queries generated per request. **Resolution** In both incidents, the operations teams: Vertically scaled a secondary database replica and redirected traffic to it via a DNS update; Temporarily disabled mechanisms that were generating additional database load; Monitored the stabilization of availability metrics before declaring the incident resolved; Following the second incident, applied a definitive fix to the problematic query \(enforcing a limit on returned records\) and initiated a data-cleansing process for non-standard records that could replicate the scenario. **Lessons Learned** These incidents reinforced the need for defensive and systematic infrastructure design, applying explicit limits and pagination on database queries to eliminate latent risks under atypical traffic. It became evident that component migrations can inadvertently strip away implicit protections against overload. This makes the implementation of declarative resilience mechanisms—such as proper timeouts, circuit breakers, and connection limits—indispensable. Additionally, the scenario highlighted the importance of investigating the root cause of recurring saturation patterns rather than relying solely on point-in-time mitigations, as well as the urgency of monitoring and refactoring architectures that multiply database calls per request to mitigate load amplification risks before they become critical. **Closing** We acknowledge the impact these instabilities caused and apologize for any inconvenience experienced by our clients and partners during these windows. Transparency regarding what happened is part of our commitment to those who trust our platform. The actions taken in response to these incidents prioritize reinforcing our environment's stability and reducing the likelihood of recurrence. We continue to invest heavily in observability, infrastructure resilience, and incident response processes to ensure an increasingly reliable service. Unico Team

Jul 2, 2026 · resolved Jul 3

### **Postmortem: WhatsApp Support Channel Instability** #### **Summary** On July 2, 2026, an instability affected our WhatsApp customer support channel. During this period, automated messages from our virtual assistant \(bot\) were not being delivered to end-users. Service was fully restored after the identification and rollback of a system change within our technology partner’s environment. #### **Impact** This incident exclusively impacted customers attempting to reach support through our WhatsApp channel. While automated messages managed by the bot failed to deliver, manual messages sent by human agents continued to operate normally. Our alternative support channels, such as email and webchat, remained fully operational and were communicated as active alternatives during the instability. #### **Root Cause** The root cause was an update deployed in the messaging service managed by our technology partner. This update introduced an incompatibility within the partner's own production environment configurations. This supplier-side infrastructure failure disrupted the automated communication flow, preventing the bot from delivering messages. #### **Resolution** Our partner's technical team investigated the issue within their environment and traced the failure back to the recently deployed update. The resolution applied by the vendor consisted of performing an immediate rollback to the previous stable version of their messaging service. Once the partner completed this rollback, message delivery was successfully restored, and our support channel returned to normal operations. #### **Lessons Learned** This incident reinforced the importance of maintaining an agile contingency and communication strategy to quickly redirect our customers to alternative channels \(such as webchat and forms\) during third-party service outages. Additionally, it highlighted the need to continuously align with our key vendors regarding the requirement for more rigorous validation and testing protocols in their own environments before promoting updates that can impact our operations.

Is unico down right now?

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