RSA ID Plus Status Page

Jun 26, 2026 · resolved Jun 26

Customers hosted in the RSA EU West production environment experienced intermittent authentication failures and service degradation. The issue was resolved, and service has returned to normal operation. RSA continues to investigate the underlying cause in collaboration with our cloud service provider.

Jun 15, 2026 · resolved Jun 15

Customers hosted in the RSA EU West production environment experienced intermittent authentication failures and service degradation. The issue was resolved, and service has returned to normal operation. RSA continues to investigate the underlying cause in collaboration with our cloud service provider.

Jun 4, 2026 · resolved Jun 4

**Summary** On June 4, 2026, between approximately 04:48:49 UTC and 05:00:18 UTC, customers hosted in the RSA EU West production environment experienced intermittent authentication failures and service degradation resulting from a cloud-provider networking event. **What Happened** During the incident window, RSA services experienced connectivity disruptions to underlying cloud infrastructure dependencies within our cloud provider environment. These connectivity issues impacted communication between application components and supporting platform services required for authentication processing. As a result, authentication requests were intermittently unable to complete successfully, resulting in customer-facing service degradation. **Timeline of Events** Application telemetry indicates the event consisted of multiple periods of degradation and recovery as the underlying cloud-provider networking infrastructure stabilized and recovery operations were processing. While customer impact was observed between approximately 04:49 UTC and 05:00 UTC, the severity of the event fluctuated during that period rather than remaining constant throughout. **Root Cause** RSA completed an investigation in collaboration with our cloud provider. The incident was caused by a planned cloud provider platform maintenance activity that resulted in unexpected instability within shared networking infrastructure servicing cloud platform dependencies in the EU West region. The networking instability affected connectivity between RSA application services and cloud platform services required for authentication processing, including caching and storage dependencies used by the authentication platform. As part of the investigation, RSA confirmed that the affected systems were distributed across multiple independent infrastructure groups, as required by the architecture of ID Plus. This distribution is a foundational design principle of the EU West environment and is intended to isolate routine maintenance activities and localized infrastructure failures from causing broader service impact. However, the cloud provider determined that this event involved shared networking infrastructure servicing multiple infrastructure groups simultaneously. As a result, systems that would normally operate independently experienced connectivity degradation at the same time, reducing the effectiveness of the within-region resiliency mechanisms designed to protect against localized infrastructure events. The cloud provider further determined that the maintenance activity did not proceed as expected and resulted in networking instability that exceeded the duration and recovery characteristics normally associated with routine platform maintenance activities. RSA services are designed to tolerate the brief transient interruptions that can occur during normal cloud platform maintenance operations, and the behavior observed during this incident was not representative of the brief interruptions typically expected during standard maintenance events. **Resolution** RSA engineering teams responded to the incident, validated service recovery, and engaged the cloud provider to perform a detailed review of the underlying infrastructure event. During the incident, RSA monitoring and automated service recovery mechanisms detected the degradation and initiated standard recovery actions designed to maintain service availability and recover application health. These actions included automated platform health monitoring and workload recovery processes operating within the affected environment. Service stability was restored as connectivity within the underlying cloud provider infrastructure recovered and networking services stabilized. Once connectivity was re-established, application services returned to normal operation and customer authentication processing resumed successfully.

Apr 1, 2026 · resolved Apr 1

**Summary** On 04/01/2026, RSA ID Plus experienced a service outage in the ANZ region, impacting authentication workflows and related services. The issue was caused by a performance issue at the datastore layer caused by a non-optimal query execution pattern within one of the service data tiers, which led to elevated resource utilization and increased latency. This resulted in an authentication service outage. Service was restored through a combination of capacity adjustments and regional failover, and stability has been maintained since recovery. **Preliminary** **Root Cause** The incident was attributed to a query optimizer behavior that resulted in a suboptimal execution plan within the service data tier under specific runtime conditions. Under these conditions, the optimizer selected an inefficient query execution strategy, which led to: * Increased resource consumption within the data tier * Elevated query execution times * Resource contention impacting dependent services These conditions drove increased latency and service instability within authentication workflows. The behavior is consistent with a query plan regression scenario, where the optimizer generates a plan that is not optimal for the current data distribution or workload characteristics. **Recovery** During the incident, the team followed a controlled recovery approach aligned with the platform’s resilience design. RSA ID Plus is architected with strong in-region resilience, including redundancy and scaling capabilities across service layers, as well as a warm secondary region available for failover. In line with this design, the initial response focused on stabilizing the primary region by addressing resource contention within the data tier. Failover to the secondary region is available and was successfully executed as part of the recovery. Based on real-time impact assessment and recovery progress, it was determined that in-region remediation would not restore service within acceptable thresholds. A controlled failover to the secondary region was then initiated. Following stabilization, corrective changes were implemented within the primary region to address the underlying query optimization behavior. Once these changes were validated, traffic was safely transitioned back to the primary region in a controlled manner. All systems have remained stable under continued monitoring since recovery. **Mitigation and Resolution** The following actions were taken to restore service: * **Capacity Adjustment:** Increased available resources within the data tier to reduce contention * **Regional Failover:** Traffic was redirected to a warm region to restore service responsiveness * **Service Stabilization:** Performance returned to normal following these actions **Preventive Actions** **Immediate Actions** * Identification and correction of impacted query behavior * Stabilization of query execution patterns to prevent recurrence **Vendor Engagement and Safeguard Review** As part of the ongoing investigation and prevention efforts, RSA has engaged with our data service provider to further evaluate query optimization behavior observed during the incident. This includes a focused review of existing safeguards and protective mechanisms designed to detect and mitigate suboptimal query execution patterns. While these controls are in place, this event identified conditions under which they did not intervene as expected. This review is actively in progress, and findings will be incorporated into follow-up corrective actions.

Jan 15, 2026 · resolved Jan 15

**Incident Summary** On January 15, 2026 06:45–07:15 UTC, a subset of customers hosted on the EU1 deployment in the EMEA region experienced a degradation in authentication services. The event primarily manifested as intermittent authentication disruption, with the majority of affected tenants experiencing impact for less than 40 minutes. Core platform availability remained operational throughout the event. Most customers were able to authenticate successfully during the impact window, though some authentication flows experienced slower-than-normal response times and elevated failure rates for a limited period. Service behavior returned to normal once mitigation actions were applied. **Root Cause** A January service update introduced a flaw in our upgrade handling which caused some clients to unnecessarily retrieve application resources, creating unexpected request patterns within the authentication flow. This behavior disrupted normal request patterns within the authentication flow and contributed to authentication disruption for a subset of customers. In addition, notifications on the status page occurred later than expected. During the incident, overall service availability remained operational, and the impact presented as intermittent authentication disruption rather than a sustained outage condition. Because successful authentications continued throughout the incident window for most customers, initial indicators aligned with a limited disruption scenario. Customer communication was issued as impact scope was confirmed. **Mitigation and Recovery Actions** During the incident, the following actions were taken: * Rolled back January service updates deployed prior to the incident * Scaled additional capacity within the affected EMEA deployment * Continued real-time monitoring to validate stabilization These actions successfully stabilized the environment. No recurrence has been observed since mitigation was applied. Corrective and Preventive Actions The following actions are under evaluation or implementation: * Improvements to upgrade handling to prevent unnecessary resource refresh behavior * Enhancements to monitoring and alerting to improve visibility into customer-impacting disruption scenarios * Review of incident communication workflows and notification triggers

Is RSA ID Plus down right now?

No — RSA ID Plus is up. All systems operational as of Jul 13, 11:46 PM UTC.

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