Opsgenie Status Page

Sep 14, 2026 · resolved Sep 14

### Summary On September 14, 2026, between 15:30 and 17:10 UTC, Atlassian customers using Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass experienced delays in receiving alert notifications and intermittent failures when using Ops features. The issue was triggered by long-running transactions in a core service, which led to thread pool exhaustion and caused subsequent requests to become unresponsive. The long-running transactions were caused by a configuration change released between September 9, 2026 and September 11, 2026 UTC. The team actively monitored the impact of the change on the system until early September 14, 2026 UTC, and observed no anomalies. However, increasing traffic during US working hours on September 14, 2026, caused these unexpectedly long-running transactions. The incident was detected within one minute by our automated monitoring systems, and full service stabilization occurred after isolating and rolling back the change on September 14, 2026 at 17:10 UTC. ### IMPACT The incident primarily affected Ops features across Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass for customers hosted in the US region. During the incident, the end-to-end flow for alert creation and notification delivery experienced an average delay of 22 minutes. No alerts or notification payloads were dropped during the incident; all queued events were successfully processed and delivered as services recovered. Additionally, related Ops API endpoints and Web UI flows experienced elevated latency and intermittent errors. The disruption began at 15:30 UTC and was resolved by 17:10 UTC (total duration: 1 hour and 40 minutes). Engineering teams were alerted immediately via backup disaster-alerting pipelines and began mitigation without delay. However, the disruption affected internal notification and coordination flows between cross-functional teams (including Customer Support and Incident Communications), which resulted in delays in publishing external Statuspage updates. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was triggered when a newly released configuration change made redundant downstream service calls on every page load, causing a traffic spike. The configuration change, released between September 9, 2026, and September 11, 2026, was actively monitored for impact until early September 14, 2026. However, a traffic spike during US working hours caused unexpected issues. The downstream service began rate-limiting requests, and an aggressive retry strategy without sufficient backoff held worker threads open, leading to pool exhaustion and timeouts on incoming critical traffic. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS The incident was mitigated by disabling the feature flag that triggered the inter-service rate limiting. We understand reliable access to Atlassian products is critical for your teams. We are prioritizing the following actions to prevent recurrence: - **Improve Service-to-Service Resilience** - Review and adjust rate-limiting configurations between internal services. - Optimize retry strategies to prevent long-running transactions and keep the impact isolated to problematic point. - **Improve Architectural Isolation** - Refine the architecture of this core service to have more isolation between different transactions so that degradations in one transaction type do not impact unrelated critical flows. - **Improve Proactive Alerting** - Add early-warning alerts for thread pool saturation and elevated inter-service rate-limit responses before they impact end users. - Implement backup alerting processes for customer support and incident communication paths We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Aug 27, 2026 · resolved Sep 3

On August 19, we identified an issue affecting the delivery of Microsoft Teams notifications for Opsgenie standalone customers. The root cause was attributed to an operational error caused by our external partner, and they have taken corrective measures to restore services. If you are still experiencing issues, please follow these steps to restore your integration: https://support.atlassian.com/opsgenie/docs/restore-the-opsgenie-microsoft-teams-v2-integration/. If you require further assistance, please reach out to Atlassian Support via support.atlassian.com/contact.

Jul 21, 2026 · resolved Jul 24

Our notification provider has identified the root of the issue that is causing voice call failures to some India-based mobile numbers. We understand the inconvenience this may cause and appreciate your patience while our provider works on restoring the service. If you have experienced any issues with voice notifications, please contact our Support for assistance.

Oct 20, 2025 · resolved Oct 21

### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025 ### Summary All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. Customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region. The incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025. We recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust. ### IMPACT Before examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies. Products such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1. While in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes. However, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It’s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer’s chosen region. **Jira** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \(NLB\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval. Normally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide. **Jira Service Management \(JSM\)** JSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts. **Confluence** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively. Though the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes. To protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored. **Automation** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution. During this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage. By Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers. Furthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025. **Trello** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments. **Login** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access. The issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed. **Statuspage** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps. ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS We have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues: * Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage. * Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions. * Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service. Although disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues. We recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Sep 30, 2025 · resolved Sep 30

Between 13:10 UTC to 14:00 UTC, we experienced notification delay for Jira Service Management, Opsgenie, and Compass in only EU-region. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

Is Opsgenie down right now?

No — Opsgenie is up. All systems operational as of Oct 12, 4:53 AM UTC.

What is Opsgenie's current status?

Opsgenie: All Systems Operational. Alert24 checks Opsgenie's status page continuously and can notify you the moment it changes.

How do I get alerted when Opsgenie goes down?

Alert24 monitors Opsgenie and 3,700+ other cloud and SaaS providers. When an outage is detected it updates your status page automatically and pages your on-call team — no manual checks. Start free at alert24.net.