JumpCloud Status Page

Jun 22, 2026 · resolved Jun 22

 ‌ **Date**: Jun 25, 2026 **Date of Incident:** Jun 22, 2026 **Description**: RCA for Third-Party CDN Network Disruption — Cloudflare / Zayo Fiber Cut ‌ #### **Summary:** On June 22, 2026, beginning at approximately 13:25 UTC, some JumpCloud customers experienced degraded access to web-facing services including the Admin Console, User Portal, API endpoints, and SSO authentication flows. Customers connecting through North America or accessing services routed through North American infrastructure were most affected. The root cause was a fiber cut in Eastern North America, a physical break in underground or undersea cables carrying internet traffic. Cloudflare attributed the disruption to Zayo, a network transit provider, experiencing an outage on some of its network routes, which caused reachability issues for services routing through those paths. Because JumpCloud's traffic transits the Cloudflare network before reaching JumpCloud's origin infrastructure, degradation at the Cloudflare/Zayo layer directly impacted our customers' ability to reach JumpCloud services. By late morning, most affected platforms had stabilized, with Cloudflare indicating its fix was being actively rolled out. JumpCloud's backend services and data plane remained fully operational throughout the event. The issue was isolated to the traffic path between end users and JumpCloud's origin infrastructure. ‌ #### **What Happened:** JumpCloud utilizes Cloudflare as the security and networking layer in front of all its global infrastructure. All HTTP/HTTPS requests to JumpCloud's web services traverse the Cloudflare network before reaching JumpCloud's origin infrastructure. ‌ #### **Provider Root Cause:** Cloudflare engineers first detected elevated error rates and latency at approximately 13:25 UTC on June 22, 2026. By 14:37 UTC, they had traced the root cause to a fiber cut in Eastern North America. Cloudflare confirmed that Zayo, a network provider, was experiencing an outage on some of its network routes, causing sites and services routing through those paths to become unreachable. Cloudflare's status page indicated that customers connecting through North America or accessing services in Europe may have seen increased latencies and timeouts as Cloudflare engineers worked to mitigate the issue. Traffic engineering efforts successfully mitigated the majority of congestion and packet drops, with services reported as largely stable with only minor residual impact remaining. Cloudflare's scheduled Newark \(EWR\) datacenter maintenance overlapped in timing but was a separate event - it was not the root cause of the fiber cut outage. ‌ #### **Corrective Actions \(Target End-of-July 2026\)**: While this incident was caused by a third-party provider we recognize the impact it had on our customers. JumpCloud is committed to reducing our exposure to single-provider failures and improving our resilience posture. The following corrective actions are actively underway: * **Multi-CDN Redundancy:** Cloudflare remains part of our architecture. We are adding a parallel, independently operated CDN path with weighted routing and security parity across both, so traffic can shift automatically if one path degrades. When complete, JumpCloud's edge will be capable of routing around a complete outage of any single CDN provider without customer action or service interruption. This work is in active delivery within our Platform Engineering organization. * **Resilient DNS Management:** We are modernizing how we manage DNS with phased, automated changes and rollback capabilities, reducing the risk that DNS operations themselves become a source of disruption. * **Validated Failover:** We are running controlled failover exercises including a production-scale test before relying on this redundancy in production. * **Enhanced Third-Party Monitoring & Automated Alerting:** We are expanding our monitoring to include automated detection of third-party provider degradation, enabling faster incident declaration and more rapid customer communication. This includes synthetic monitoring from multiple geographic regions that can differentiate between JumpCloud-origin issues and upstream provider issues ‌ #### **Provider Remediation:** Cloudflare has communicated the following remediation actions: * **Transit Path Restoration:** Cloudflare is coordinating with Zayo and fiber providers to repair the affected Eastern North American routes and restore full transit capacity. * **Traffic Engineering Response:** Cloudflare's traffic engineering teams implemented manual rerouting to redistribute load across unaffected network paths during the incident window. * **Ongoing Investigation:** Cloudflare has indicated a full post-incident review is underway to assess automated failover capabilities for large-scale transit provider failures. ‌ JumpCloud takes the reliability and availability of our platform seriously. We understand that our customers depend on JumpCloud for critical identity and device management operations, and any disruption, regardless of its origin, impacts their business. We are actively investing in infrastructure resilience to ensure that our dependency on any single third-party provider does not create an unacceptable risk to service availability.

May 8, 2026 · resolved May 8

This incident has been resolved.

Apr 28, 2026 · resolved Apr 28

The incident has been resolved.

Apr 2, 2026 · resolved Apr 2

This incident has been resolved.

Mar 31, 2026 · resolved Mar 31

 **Date**: Apr 7, 2026 **Date of Incident:** Mar 30, 2026 **Description**: RCA for Directory Association Processing Delays ‌ **Summary:** Starting March 30th at approximately 15:40 MDT, JumpCloud customers experienced significant delays in directory-related updates. This included latency in password changes, user-to-group associations, and outbound provisioning reflecting in downstream systems. The root cause was identified as a specific code deployment in our Devices service that inadvertently flooded a background processing queue with unpartitioned messages, causing a bottleneck that prevented updates from processing in real-time. The issue was fully resolved by 00:25 MDT on March 31, 2026. ‌ **What Happened:** The incident was caused by a change in how the JumpCloud agent retrieves software application configurations. 1. **Traffic Spike:** The new code shifted the "source of truth" for these configurations to a new database. If a device polled the system and did not find its record in the new database, the code automatically enqueued a "track collect" request to sync the data. 2. **Unexpected Volume:** We anticipated a "lazy backfill" \(where records are created over time\), but underestimated the number of devices that had no existing software bindings. This resulted in an immediate, massive spike of nearly 280,000 messages. 3. **The Bottleneck \(Partitioning\):** Crucially, these specific messages were enqueued without a "Partition ID." In our high-scale FIFO \(First-In-First-Out\) queue architecture, messages without a partition ID are processed one-by-one rather than in parallel. This effectively "serialized" the queue, preventing us from scaling up workers to process the backlog faster and causing the observed latency. ‌ **Resolution and Recovery**: Once the offending code was rolled back, the "tap" was turned off, and no further unpartitioned messages were added to the queue. Because the bottleneck was caused by the lack of partitioning, simply scaling horizontally could not speed up the processing of the existing backlog. The team monitored the queue throughput and determined that the safest and fastest path to recovery was allowing the worker to process the existing messages sequentially rather than risking further disruption by attempting to manually manipulate the production queue. ‌ **Corrective Actions**: To ensure this type of bottleneck does not occur again, we have committed to the following: * Improving pre-production testing to better simulate the scale and conditions that can occur in production queue processing * Reviewing other areas of the platform where similar patterns could produce unexpected request spikes * Enhancing monitoring and alerting thresholds to enable faster detection and response when queue backlogs begin to form * Strengthening our deployment validation process to more thoroughly account for background data migrations before releasing dependent code changes

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No — JumpCloud is up. All systems operational as of Jul 13, 11:42 PM UTC.

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